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ABSTRACT: Nick Bostrom’s Simulation Argument (SA) has many intriguing 
theological implications.  We work out some of them here.  We show how the SA can be 
used to develop novel versions of the Cosmological and Design Arguments.  We then 
develop some of the affinities between Bostrom’s naturalistic theogony and more 
traditional theological topics.  We look at the resurrection of the body and at theodicy.  
We conclude with some reflections on the relations between the SA and Neoplatonism 






A well-known argument, recently developed by Nick Bostrom, aims to assign a 
probability to the thesis that we are living in a simulated reality (Bostrom, 2003; see also 
Weatherson, 2003; Bostrom, 2005; Brueckner, 2008).  At least one commentator has said 
that Bostrom’s Simulation Argument is the first interesting argument for the existence of 
God in 2000 years.1  An overreaction, to say the least!  Nevertheless, the Simulation 
Argument has many intriguing theological implications.  And few of them have been 
worked out.   We aim to work out some of them here. 
 
According to Bostrom, simulations can be nested within simulations.  Section 2 develops 
this idea.  This nesting parallels certain sequential structures in the traditional arguments 
for the existence of God.  Section 3 examines the relations between the Simulation 
Argument and various forms of the Cosmological Argument for God.  The Simulation 
Argument is analogous to Leibniz’s version of the Cosmological Argument.  By taking 
advantage of this analogy, we obtain a novel version of the Cosmological Argument.  
One striking feature of this argument is that it uses infinity in a positive way.   
 
Section 4 examines the relations between the Simulation Argument and the Design 
Argument.  The Simulation Argument motivates a novel version of the Design Argument.  
Section 5 develops some of the affinities between Bostrom’s naturalistic theogony and 
John Hick’s resurrection theory.  Section 6 articulates a simulationist theodicy.  Not 
surprisingly, this is an aesthetic theodicy.  And John Leslie’s axiarchism allows us to link 
the simulationist account of value with the simulationist account of divine productivity.  
Section 7 extends the Simulation Argument to the higher transfinite.  Section 8 concludes 
with some reflections on the relations between simulationism and Neoplatonism 




2. The Simulation Argument 
 
Various writers have suggested that our universe is a software process running on some 
deeper computational substrate (Moravec, 1988; Tipler, 1995; Fredkin, 2003).2 Our 
reality is virtual rather than ultimate.3  More recently, Bostrom (2003) has given an 
argument for this thesis.  His argument is known as the Simulation Argument.4  We don’t 
want to rehearse it here and we aren’t interested in the strength of the Simulation 
Argument.  We’re interested in its theological implications. 
 
For our purposes, the most striking feature of the Simulation Argument is that it justifies 
the existence of a series of levels of simulation.  Our universe is a virtual machine – a 
machine running on a deeper machine.  As Bostrom writes “virtual machines can be 
stacked: it is possible to simulate one machine simulating another machine, and so on, in 
arbitrarily many steps of iteration” (2003: 253).    
 
How deep does the series of simulations go?  If it ends after some finite number of steps, 
we may wonder why.  Any finite number seems arbitrary.  For any finite n, why n levels 
rather than n+1?  A more general principle is more reasonable.  And any reasoning that 
applies to our universe surely applies with equal force to any universe that is simulating 
our universe.  So if there is any plausibility to the thesis that our universe is being 
simulated by some deeper universe, then there is equal plausibility to the thesis that every 
universe is being simulated by some deeper universe.  The Simulation Argument supports 
the general thesis that below every level, there is a deeper level.  There is an endless 
series of ever deeper levels.  It is defined by these rules: 
 
2.1 Initial Rule.  For the initial number 0, there is an initial universe U0.  This is our universe.5 We have computers in our universe.  These are level-0 computers.    
According to the Simulation Argument, our universe is a software process running on 
some level-1 computer.  This is hardware level 1.   Let’s refer to this computer as H1.  H1 is not in our universe.  It is in the next deeper universe.  The Simulation Argument entails there exists a deeper computer H1 running in a universe U1.   Presumably, the computer H1 was built and programmed by a civilization C1 in U1.   
2.2 Successor Rule.  The Simulation Argument generalizes.  Just as our universe U0 is a software process running on a computer in U1, so also U1 is a software process running on a computer in U2.  But then U2 is a software process running on a computer in U3; and so it goes.  The general rule is this: for every finite n, the universe Un is a software process running on a computer Hn+1 in the deeper universe Un+1.  This rule is existential: for every n, if there exists a universe Un, then there exists a universe Un+1.  The universe Un+1 contains a computer Hn+1.  Presumably, the computer Hn+1 was built and programmed by some civilization Cn+1 in Un+1. 
 
A few features of this sequence are worth noting.  The first is that each deeper universe 
Un+1 physically contains the shallower universe Un.  The deeper universe contains the 
shallower universe both spatially, temporally, and causally.  Thus each deeper universe is 
longer lasting both into the past and the future.6  As we go down through the deeper and 
deeper universes, their temporal extensions expand without bound.  Likewise, the 
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physical powers of these of these deeper computers increase without bound.  Finally, the 
intelligences of the civilizations also increase without bound. 
 
Although the Simulation Argument is naturalistic, Bostrom points out that it has many 
potentially religious consequences.  Suppose that our civilization C0 is being simulated by 
a deeper civilization  C1.   This deeper civilization is technically superior to ours – it is a 
post-human civilization.  Bostrom writes that 
 
in some ways, the posthumans running a simulation are like gods in relation to the 
people inhabiting the simulation: the posthumans created the world we see; they 
are of superior intelligence; they are ‘omnipotent’ in the sense that they can 
interfere in the workings of our world even in ways that violate its physical laws; 
and they are ‘omniscient’ in the sense that they can monitor everything that 
happens.  However, all the demigods except those at the fundamental level of 
reality are subject to sanctions by the more powerful gods living at lower levels.  
(2003: 253 – 254) 
 
 
3. The Cosmological Argument 
 
One of the classical arguments for the existence of God is the Cosmological Argument.   
There are many versions of the Cosmological Argument – the first three arguments for 
the existence of God in Aquinas’s list of the Five Ways are all versions of the 
Cosmological Argument (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part 1, Q. 2, Art. 3).  One version 
of the Cosmological Argument is based on physical (efficient) causality.7  This version is 
Aquinas’s Second Way.  It goes something like this: (1) every event is caused by a 
previous event; (2) but the chain of causes cannot go back to infinity; (3) therefore, there 
is a first cause; and (4) this first cause is God.  
 
One of the standard objections to the classical Cosmological Argument is that the second 
premise is false.  There is nothing impossible in a chain of causes that goes back 
infinitely.  So the classical version of the Cosmological Argument fails.  Aware of this 
objection, Leibniz proposed a more sophisticated version of the Cosmological Argument.  
It’s worth looking at the entire text of the Leibnizian Argument.  For the sake of 
readability, we have taken the liberty of breaking Leibniz’s text into steps: 
 
(1) Neither in any single thing, nor in the total aggregate and series of things, can 
the sufficient reason for their existence be discovered. (2) Let us suppose a book 
entitled The Elements of Geometry to have existed eternally, one edition having 
always been copied from the preceding. (3) Although you can account for the 
present copy by a reference to the past copy which it reproduces, yet, however far 
back you go in this series of reproductions, you can never arrive at a complete 
explanation.  (4) You always will have to ask why at all times these books have 
existed, that is, why there have been any books at all and why this book in 
particular. (5) What is true concerning these books is equally true concerning the 
diverse states of the world, for here too the following state is in some way a copy 
 4 
of the preceding one (although changing according to certain laws). (6) However 
far you turn back to antecedent states, you will never discover in any or all of 
these states the full reason why there is a world rather than nothing, nor why it is 
such as it is.  (7) You may well suppose the world to be eternal; yet what you thus 
posit is nothing but the succession of its states, and you will not find the sufficient 
reason in any one of them, nor will you get any nearer to accounting rationally for 
the world by taking any number of them together.  (8) The reason must therefore 
be sought elsewhere. (9) Things eternal may have no cause of existence, yet a 
reason for their existence must be conceived. (10) Hence it is evident that even by 
supposing the world to be eternal, the recourse to an ultimate reason for the world 
beyond this world, that is, to God, cannot be avoided.  (11) The reasons for the 
world are therefore concealed in some entity outside the world, which is different 
from the chain or series of things, the aggregate of which constitutes the world.  
(Leibniz, 1988: 84 – 85) 
 
The structure of the Leibnizian Argument is analogous to the structure of the generalized 
Simulation Argument.   All you need to do is to replace the notion of a previous edition 
of The Elements of Geometry with a deeper finite computer.  The computational version 
of the Leibnizian argument is the Computational Argument.  It goes like this: (1) Neither 
in any single thing, nor in the total aggregate and series of things, can the sufficient 
reason for their existence be discovered.  (2) Let us suppose an endless series of finite 
computers, each computer always being simulated by a deeper finite computer.  (3) 
Although you can account for any given finite computer by a reference to the deeper 
finite computer, which simulates it, yet, however far back you go in this series of finite 
computers, you can never arrive at a complete explanation.  (4) You always will have to 
ask why at all times these finite computers have existed, that is, why there have been any 
finite computers at all and why these finite computers in particular.  (5) The best 
explanation for this whole series of finite computers is the existence of an infinite 
computer.   
 
This infinite computer is deeper than any finite computer.  It is infinitely deep.  This 
infinite computer is more powerful than any finite computer.  It is infinitely powerful.  
Now, mathematicians use the symbol ω to refer to the least number that lies beyond all 
finite numbers. So we refer to the infinite computer as Hω.  The infinite computer is 
ultimate – it is the sufficient reason for all other computers.  It is God.  On the basis of the 
Computational Argument, we add a Final Rule to our previous rules: 
 
3.1 Initial Rule.  For the initial number 0, there is an initial universe U0.  This is our universe.  It is a software process running on a finite computer H1 in a deeper universe U1.  Our universe U0 stands to the computer H1 as software to hardware.   H1 was built and programmed by a civilization C1 in U1.   
3.2 Successor Rule.  For every finite n, the universe Un is a software process running on a finite computer Hn+1 in the deeper universe Un+1.  The universe Un stands to the computer Hn+1 as software to hardware.  The computer Hn+1 was built and programmed by some civilization Cn+1 in Un+1.  Each deeper finite computer is longer lasting both into the past and future.  It is causally responsible for its universe. 
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3.3 Final Rule.   There is an infinitely deep computer.  For every finite n, the universe Un 
is a software process ultimately being run by God.  For every finite n, Un stands to 
God as software to hardware.  However, God does not stand as software to any 
deeper hardware.  Extrapolating from the features of the computers in the finite 
series, it follows that: God is infinitely powerful; God is infinitely intelligent; God is 
everlasting both into the past and future. God is causally responsible for every finite 
universe at every moment of its existence.8  God is a self-conscious and self-directing 
intellect.  Thus God is maximally early, creative, powerful, and intelligent.  On this 
view, God is functionally equivalent to an infinite self-programming computer.   
 
These rules define an endless series of increasingly deep finite computers.  This series 
converges to a computer that lies outside of the series – it converges to God.  To be sure, 
these rules generate many theological implications.  We cannot look at them all.  
However, two of these theological implications are worthy of explicit attention. 
 
First, these rules imply that God is infinite in a mathematically (and thus 
computationally) precise way.  For every finite number n, there is a computer whose 
power is proportional to n.  More powerful computers have more memory and are faster.  
The series of increasingly powerful finite computers converges to an infinitely powerful 
computer.  Any universal Turing machine has infinite memory (UTM; Turing, 1936; 
Hopcroft, 1984).   But any UTM only operates at some finite speed.  For truly infinitely 
powerful computers, we need to turn to accelerating universal Turing machines (ATMs).  
ATMs can compute functions that cannot be computed by any UTM (Copeland, 1998a, 
1998b).  ATMs can perform super-tasks (Koetsier & Allis, 1997).  This leads to the 
unusual conclusion that God is functionally equivalent to (at least) an ATM.9 
 
Second, these rules imply that the nature of God is distinct from the natures of the other 
computers in significant ways.  For every finite n, the universe Un stands to computer 
Hn+1 as software to hardware.  Thus every computer in Un stands to Hn+1 as software to 
hardware.   For each finite n, the computer Hn stands to the computer Hn+1 as software to 
hardware.  Hence every finite computer is both software and hardware.   However, God is 
outside of this series.  God is not software to any deeper hardware.   God is pure 
hardware (which, for the simulationist, is perhaps analogous to saying that God is pure 
being).  And since the physicality of every universe (and every computer in it) is derived 
from the fact that it is being simulated (that it is being produced by an algorithm), it 
seems reasonable to associate physicality with software.  As a software process, every 
deeper universe (and every computer in it) is more richly physical.  However, since God 
is pure hardware, God is not physical.  The reality of God is somehow deeper than any 
physicality.  Thus, in accordance with classical theories of the divine nature, God would 




4. The Design Argument 
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Another classical argument for the existence of God is the Design Argument.  It shows up 
as Aquinas’s Fifth Way (Summa Theologica, Part 1, Q. 2, Art. 3).   It goes something like 
this: (1) we see that our universe contains complex internal structure; (2) if there is any 
thing with some complex internal structure, then that thing was produced by an intelligent 
designer; (3) therefore, our universe has an intelligent designer; (4) it is conventional to 
refer to the intelligent designer of our universe as God; (5) consequently, God exists.   
 
And yet, if the Simulation Argument is right, then the designer of our universe is not 
God.  It is just a deeper civilization.  Nevertheless, just as we used the Simulation 
Argument to develop a novel version of the classical Cosmological Argument, so we can 
use the Simulation Argument to develop a novel version of the classical Design 
Argument.  The sequence of deeper civilizations is a sequence of deeper designers.  God 
is the limit of the sequence of designers.  These rules present the sequences: 
 
4.1 Initial Rule.  There is an initial civilization C0.  It is our civilization.  It is temporally latest and the least intelligent of all civilizations.  Our civilization is not fundamental.  
It is part of a software process running on a computer.  This computer was built and 
programmed by a deeper civilization C1.  This deeper civilization is more intelligent and more powerful than our civilization.  
 
4.2 Successor Rule.  For every finite n, if there is a civilization Cn, then there is a deeper 
civilization Cn+1.  The deeper civilization Cn+1 is earlier than, more powerful than, and 
more intelligent than the shallower civilization Cn.  Each deeper civilization looks like 
a unitary mind to any shallower civilization.  The deeper civilization Cn+1 is an 
intelligent designer that guides the activity of Cn.    
4.3 Final Rule.  There is an earliest and causally original designer.  It is the unmoved 
mover; the uncaused cause; the undesigned designer.  It is more powerful than and 
more intelligent than every finite civilization.  It is infinitely powerful and intelligent.  
It is an infinitely powerful mind.  It guides the activities of all the civilizations of 
which it is the cause.  This infinitely deep designer is God. 
 
We now have a nice model of the degrees of perfection argument.  An early version of 
this argument is presented by Augustine (1993: 40 – 64).  Anselm presented his version 
in Chapter 4 of his Monologion  (Anselm, 1076: 14 - 16).  A later version is Aquinas’s 
Fourth Way  (Summa Theologica, Part 1, Q. 2, Art. 3).  The degrees of perfection 
argument posits a series of degrees of perfection.  Things in the higher degrees are more 
perfect than the things in the lower degrees.  A computer x is more perfect than a 
computer y if and only if (iff) x can do whatever y can do but y cannot do whatever x can 
do.  For any computers x and y, x is more perfect than y iff x can simulate y but y cannot 
simulate x.  On this view, degrees of perfection are degrees of computation.   
 
If this picture is right, then God is something like the ground of being (Tillich, 1951).  
God supports an infinite hierarchy of simulators.  Each simulator in this hierarchy 
produces the next shallower simulator.  This picture of divine productivity does not have 
much in common with the picture of divine creativity painted by traditional theism.  The 
Simulation Argument does not depict God as the traditional Judeo-Christian creator.  On 
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the contrary, this picture of divine productivity is quite similar to the picture painted by 
various versions of Neoplatonism.  Generally speaking, Neoplatonism says that, God (the 
One) is the source of all reality.  Reality is stratified into a hierarchy of levels of 
perfection (degrees of being).  God emanates the entire series of degrees and each degree 
emanates the next degree in the series.  The Simulation Argument supports this general 
Neoplatonic picture.  More specifically, the theological implications of the Simulation 
Argument overlap at many places with the more modern Neoplatonism developed by 
John Leslie (2007). 
 
 
5. Naturalistic Theogony 
 
An afterlife is possible in a world of nested simulators.  Bostrom writes that “if nobody 
can be sure that they are at the basement-level, then everybody would have to consider 
the possibility that their actions would be rewarded or punished, perhaps using moral 
criteria, by their simulators.  An afterlife would be a real possibility.” (Bostrom, 2003: 
254).  How would this work?  One possibility is that, while you are living, your entire life 
is being recorded by the computer that is running our universe.  Your biography is stored 
in the memory of this computer.  After you die, your simulators can use this record to re-
create you.  After you die, your simulators might re-create you in another simulation.  
Alternatively, they might equip you with an artificial body, so that you can interact with 
them in their civilization.  The theory of computational re-creation closely parallels the 
computational resurrection theories proposed by many recent writers (e.g. Hick, 1976; 
Polkinghorne, 1985: 180-181; and Mackay, 1997: 248 - 249).  For example, Reichenbach 
describes computational resurrection like this: 
 
Viewed monistically, man is nothing more than a physical organism constructed 
and programmed in a certain fashion. . . . Some have likened man to an extremely 
complex computer with a physical body.  If one adopts this analogy, and applies it 
to the issue of life after death, the following would be the monistic re-creationist’s 
thesis: just as one can construct two computers to look identical, program them 
identically, and feed them precisely the same program data, so it would not seem 
to be self-contradictory that an individual could be physically re-created to 
possess all the physical characteristics of the deceased in identical proportions and 
correlations, such that he would look identical to the person who died, and since 
consciousness is a brain process, that his brain could be re-created and 
programmed as to have identical neural and chemical components and structures, 
such that he would possess the same memories, ideas, perspectives, and 
personality traits as the individual who died.  In short, a person precisely identical 
to the one who died could be re-created, with the result that the re-created person 
would be the same person as the deceased; he would begin to live where the 
deceased left off.  (Reichenbach, 1978: 27) 
 
Since there are many levels in the hierarchy of simulators, you can be resurrected many 
times.  On each resurrection, you move to the next deeper (and more real) level.  You 
move closer and closer to God.  This parallels the pareschatology of John Hick.  Hick 
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posits a series of resurrections.  He argues that the purpose of human life is to move to 
divine perfection.  But the path from human imperfection to divine perfection is too long 
to travel in a single step.  Hence human life must move towards divine perfection in 
stages.  Hick says that the post-mortem career of every human “occurs in successive 
sections rather than as one continuous unit. . . . periodic death (like periodic sleep) 
divides up an existence which, as finite creatures, we can only live in limited phases” 
(1976: 413 - 414).  He posits “a plurality of lives in a plurality of worlds; . . . each stage 
will have the relative autonomy which makes it a ‘real life’, with its own exigencies and 
tasks and its own possibilities of success and failure” (1976: 419).  A human career 
consists of “a series of lives, each bounded by something analogous to birth and death, 
lived in other worlds in spaces other than that in which we now live” (1976: 456). 
 
Although Hick’s theory of serial resurrection is motivated by the traditional Christian 
doctrine of resurrection, it departs from it in many ways.  It is more similar to the 
classical Neoplatonic idea of the return of the self to God.  So if the Simulation Argument 
supports something like Hick’s theory of serial resurrection, then it supports something 
more like classical Neoplatonism.  Once again, the theological picture painted by the 
Simulation Argument is more Neoplatonic than Christian.  
 
 
6.  Aesthetic Theodicy 
 
If we are being simulated, then why are we being simulated?  There are two ways to try 
to answer this question.  The first way is to treat our universe as an artifact and to see if it 
has any features that point to some specific functionality.  The second way is to reason 
backwards analogically from our own simulations.  
 
We start with the first way.  Is there any purpose for which our universe appears to have 
been designed?  Say a universe U is finely tuned for F iff the basic features of U mean 
that F is common in U, while any slight variation of the basic features of U would mean 
that F is rare in U.  If our universe is finely tuned for some F, then we may infer that it 
has been designed for the production of F.  The purpose of our universe is to produce F.  
Many writers say our universe is finely tuned for life (see, for example, Barrow & Tipler, 
1986; Leslie, 1989).  However, this does not seem right.  We don’t have much evidence 
that life is common.  And if the basic features of our universe were even slightly varied, 
then it is likely that more than just life would become rare.  All complexity, living or not, 
would become rare.  It is therefore more reasonable to think that our universe is finely 
tuned for the evolution of complexity  (Chaisson, 2001). 
 
We now run a Fine Tuning Argument: (1) Our universe is finely tuned for the evolution 
of complexity.  (2) The best explanation for this fine tuning is that our universe was 
designed by an intelligence that values the evolution of complexity.  So, by inference to 
the best explanation, (3) our universe is being simulated because the designers value the 
evolution of complexity.  Clearly, this Fine Tuning Argument reinforces our earlier 
version of the Design Argument.  It can be applied at every level.  And it can be applied 
to the entire hierarchy of levels.  Why is there something rather than nothing?  Why is 
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there a hierarchy of simulators, rather than none at all?  The simulationist answer is that 
the evolution of complexity is intrinsically valuable.  
 
We now turn to the second way.  Why are we being simulated?  According to the second 
way, we reason backwards analogically from our own simulations.  We typically make 
simulations for two purposes: science and entertainment.  By analogy, it is likely that our 
designers have made our universe either for science, or for entertainment, or for both.  If 
they have made it for science, then everything that goes on in our universe has epistemic 
value.  If they have made it for entertainment, then everything that goes on in our 
universe has dramatic value.   It has aesthetic value. 
 
If the simulationist needs a theodicy, he or she will turn to aesthetic theodicy.   Aesthetic 
theodicy seems to originate with Plotinus (Enneads, 2.3.18, 3.2.15-18, 3.6.2).  So here is 
another point where simulationist theology is Neoplatonic.  And from Plotinus to the 
modern age, aesthetic theodicy has a rich history.  Notable examples of aesthetic 
theodicies include the theodicies of Augustine and Leibniz.  It is most recently developed 
by Nietzsche: “it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are 
eternally justified” (The Birth of Tragedy, 5).  For Nietzsche, aesthetic theodicy is 
Dionysian affirmation; it is the love of fate – amor fati.10 
 
Why are we being simulated?  And why are there any simulations rather than none?  We 
have three answers: at every level, the designers are interested in the evolution of 
complexity; in knowledge; and in dramatic beauty.   Obviously, these three concepts 
overlap.   They share a common core.  It’s reasonable to refer to this common core as 
interestingness.   It’s not likely that a creative intelligence would be interested in simple 
systems; nor in systems that are easy to understand; nor in systems that are dull or ugly.  
As creative intelligence of an agent increases, so does the interest of that agent in 
complexity, in epistemic richness, and dramatic beauty.   
 
At the risk of sounding circular, the simulationist can say that we are being simulated 
because every creative intelligence is interested in interestingness.   But this circularity is 
virtuous: why are there any simulations at all?  Because interestingness is interesting.  
We are close here to an axiological version of the principle of sufficient reason.  Why is 
there something rather than nothing?  John Leslie has argued that the best explanation is 
that some axiological principles are intrinsically and necessarily creatively effective (see 
Leslie, 1970, 1979, 1980, 1989).  A simulationist version of Leslie’s axiarchism says that 
interestingness is both sufficient for itself and for all other things.  Here is the 
simulationist version of the classical thesis that God is self-explaining.  Of course, this 
self-justification risks collapse into triviality; but on that point it is surely no worse than 
any other theory that posits a self-justifying God. 
 
It is easy to link simulationist theodicy with simulationist soteriology.  Just as we are 
more likely to make and preserve the records of the lives of those who are interesting (of 
those who are exceptional), so also our designers are more likely to make and preserve 
records of the lives of those who are interesting.  This leads to a kind of Nietzschean 
aesthetic imperative: “Lead an interesting life!” (see Hanson, 2001).  This isn’t quite the 
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same as live fast, die young, stay pretty.  Nietzsche famously urges us to “Live 
dangerously!” (The Gay Science, 283).  He doesn’t urge us to live stupidly.  Nor does he 
urge us to live without compassion. 
 
 
7. Generalization to Higher Infinities 
 
According to our reasoning so far, God is at the level indexed by the first infinite number.  
Technically, God is at level ω.  God is the computer Hω.  We suggested that Hω is an 
accelerating universal Turing machine.  You might object that this isn’t a very big 
infinity.  After all, modern mathematics defines a wonderfully rich sequence of 
increasingly large infinities.  So, if God is Hω, then God is rather weak.  We reply that it is 
easy to extend our reasoning to the higher infinities.  For the sake of completeness, we 
briefly sketch this extension.  But we won’t go into detail.  The details are highly 
technical and contribute little to the philosophical or theological theory.   
 
To extend our reasoning to the higher infinities, we need to assume some class theory.  
We use VNB to denote the Von Neumann - Godel - Bernays class theory plus axioms for 
all consistently definable large cardinals (see Hamilton, 1982; Devlin, 1991; Drake, 
1974).   VNB defines a transfinite ordinal number line.  We refer to this as the Long Line.  
There are three kinds of ordinals on the Long Line.  These are the initial ordinal; the 
successor ordinals; and the limit ordinals.  Beyond the Long Line, there is the proper 
class of all ordinals Ω.   Ω is not an ordinal, but it acts like one.  So we have four rules: 
one for each type of ordinal and one for the proper class of all ordinals.  Thus: 
 
7.1 Initial Rule.  For the initial ordinal 0 on the Long Line, there is an initial civilization 
C0.  It is our civilization.  It is the latest and the least intelligent of all civilizations.  Our civilization is part of a software process running on a computer.  This computer 
was built and programmed by a deeper civilization C1.  This deeper civilization is more intelligent and more powerful than our civilization.  
 
7.2 Successor Rule.  For every successor ordinal n+1 on the Long Line, there is a 
civilization Cn+1. The deeper civilization Cn+1 is earlier and later than, more powerful 
than, and more intelligent than the shallower civilization Cn.  The deeper civilization 
Cn+1 is an intelligent designer that guides the activity of Cn.  
7.3 Limit Rule.  For every limit ordinal L on the Long Line, there exists a limit 
civilization CL.  Any limit civilization is earlier and later than, more powerful than, and more intelligent than every civilization in the series of which it is a limit.   Any 
limit civilization guides the activity of every civilization in the series of which it is 
the limit.  Any limit civilization is infinitely intelligent.  It is an infinitely powerful 
mind – a super-mind (see Steinhart, 2003). 
 
7.4 Final Rule.  For the proper class Ω, there exists an absolute creator CΩ.  This creator is 






We started with Bostrom’s Simulation Argument.  On the basis of this argument, we 
developed novel versions of the Cosmological and Design Arguments.   We then turned 
to soteriology, and developed a theory of the afterlife.  At several crucial points, the 
theology that follows from the Simulation Argument is closer to Neoplatonism than to 
Christian theism.   Simulationist theology is highly Neoplatonic. 
 
Neoplatonists can happily embrace the hierarchy of computers.  This is just the old great 
chain of being (Lovejoy, 1936).   It has clear parallels in the Enneads of Plotinus and in 
The Elements of Theology of Proclus (1992).  The series of degrees of computation 
clearly resembles the old Neoplatonic hierarchies.  Deeper computers stand to shallower 
computers as hardware to software.   And hardware stands to software as real to virtual.  
The numbers that index the degrees in the hierarchy are thus like Neoplatonic degrees of 
being.  Lesser degrees are less real.    But we don’t think of degree 0 as non-being.  After 
all, we do exist.  On the contrary, the indexes of degrees measure creativity.  The intellect 
in the deepest degree is maximally creative.  It emanates all other intellects.  An intellect 
on any positive degree has some remaining creative power and thus emanates intellects in 
lesser degrees.  At degree 0, creative power is exhausted.  (Of course, we might not be in 
degree 0 – we may yet simulate other universes.) 
 
Neoplatonism is closely connected with mysticism.  For example, the Plotinian One is 
beyond being and beyond cognition.  It is experienced only through an intimate union.  
Our computational analysis parallels this Neoplatonic mysticism.  Since CΩ is at the level 
of a proper class, it is transcendental.  Proper classes are, in a very precise sense, beyond 
logic.  They are beyond mathematical comprehension.  They are transcendental objects.  
We can say that they exist, but we can say very little else about them.  And our 
understanding of them is always partial and approximate – we can never totally grasp 
them by any reasoning.  So there is some justification for mysticism about CΩ.  Even the 
most cold-blooded logician can recognize that with objects at the level of proper classes, 
we have reached the absolute edge of reason.  We have likewise reached the absolute 
edge of predication.   When we defined Ω, we pointed out both that it is analogous to a 
number but that it is not a number.  Likewise, it would be better to say that for any 
predicate F, God is analogous to an F but God is not an F.  For example, God is 
analogous to a mind but God is not a mind.  This is also Neoplatonic.  Of course, this 
mysticism may seem too negative.  On a more positive note, we might employ some sort 
of reflection principle to characterize God.11  For instance, we might say that for any 
computational power P, if God has P, then there is some les powerful computer that is 
simulated by God that has P. 
 
Finally, we want to end with some critical remarks on the methods we have used to 
define God.  Our extensions of the Cosmological and Design Arguments involved infinite 
regressions.  Cantorian principles were employed to tame these regressions.  For 
example, an infinite depth is below every finite depth.  They are no longer vicious in any 
old-fashioned, pre-Cantorian sense.  Nevertheless, we remain suspicious about infinite 
regressions.  Working backwards does not easily allow us to work forwards.  And much 
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of the most interesting modern theology involves the centrality of progress.  Consider, 
for example, process theology.  It would be nice to have arguments for the existence of 
God that make progress along the positive number line.  There are many opportunities 
here for deep suspicion and skepticism.  Still, the Simulation Argument has many 





1Bostrom quotes David Pearce as saying that “The Simulation Argument is perhaps the 
first interesting argument for the existence of a Creator in 2000 years.”  See 
<www.simulation-argument.com>.   Accessed 11 January 2009. 
2We already have computers that approximately simulate our whole universe.  For 
example, the Millennium Simulation simulated the evolution of our whole universe from 
the Big Bang to the far future at the level of galactic detail (Springel et al., 2005).  It is 
easy to imagine more precise simulations – simulations that run our whole universe at the 
level of stars; molecules; atoms; particles.   Many writers have argued that our universe is 
only finitely complex (see Fredkin, 1991; Finkelstein, 1995; Zeilinger, 1999).  
Specifically, Lloyd (2002) calculates that our universe so far has run only 10120 operations 
involving 10120 bits.  These are finite numbers.  If our universe is only finitely complex, 
then it can easily be running as a virtual machine on some deeper computer. 
3We say that something is ultimate iff it does not depend for its continuing existence on 
any other thing; we say something is virtual iff it is not ultimate.   If something is virtual, 
then it is virtual with respect to something on which it depends.  If x is virtual with 
respect to y, then y is the sustaining or supporting cause of the existence of x.  That is, y 
continuously creates x.  Conversely, x emerges from and thus supervenes on the activity 
of y.  For example, an electromagnetic field is virtual relative to its generator.  The 
motion of the generator is a sustaining or supporting cause of the field.  The field is not 
identical with the motion of the generator; on the contrary, the field emerges from and 
thus supervenes on that activity.  For an epiphenomenalist, the mind is virtual with 
respect to the brain.  In the context of computing, software is virtual with respect to 
hardware. 
4The Simulation Argument shows that at least one of these is true: “(1) the fraction of 
human level civilizations that reach a post human stage is very close to zero; (2) the 
fraction of posthuman civilizations that are interested in running ancestor-simulations is 
very close to zero; (3) the fraction of all people with our kind of experiences who are 
living in a simulation is very close to one.” (Bostrom, 2003: 255).  The Argument does 
not intend to show that option (3) is true, and Bostrom suggests that, given our current 
ignorance, we assign roughly equal probabilities to all three options.  
5We said that our universe is on level 0.  But if we run universe simulations in our 
universe, then our universe won’t be on level 0.  This is not an issue.  Our universe would 
just move down in the hierarchy and we would remap all the relevant numbers. 
6One might wonder why each deeper universe is longer lasting both into the past and the 
future.  Since it takes at least one computational step to initiate a simulation, each deeper 
universe must exist at least one moment earlier than any universe it simulates.  And since 
it takes at least one computational step to terminate a simulation, each deeper universe 
must exist at least one moment later than any universe it simulates.  Hence each deeper 
universe is longer lasting both into the past and into the future. 
7The medievals (including Aquinas) distinguished between accidentally ordered causes 
and essentially ordered causes.  See Wengert (1971) and Harrison (1974).  Accidentally 
ordered causes are sequentially operative (e.g. Abraham begets Isaac, Isaac begets 
Jacob).  Accidentally ordered causes can regress to infinity.  Essentially ordered causes 
are simultaneously operative (e.g. a man pushes a stick that pushes a stone).  Essentially 
 14 
 
ordered causes are sustaining causes: if x is an essentially ordered cause of y, then the 
activity of x is moment by moment supportive of the activity of y.  Essentially ordered 
causes cannot regress to infinity.  When it comes to the Second Way, Aquinas is talking 
about essentially ordered causes.  Hence he does not rule out an infinite temporal regress 
of accidentally ordered causes.  It follows that Aquinas can allow the universe to be 
temporally infinite into the past.  According to our generalized version of the Simulation 
Argument, the nested computers are both accidentally and essentially ordered causes. 
8God is causally responsible for every finite universe at every moment of its existence.  
This is a doctrine of continuous creation.  See Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, part 1, 
sec. 21; Meditations, 3, para. 31.  On our interpretation, continuous creation supports 4-
dimensionalist theories of physical persistence. 
9Others have said that God is an Accelerating Turing Machine.  Tipler identifies God 
with his Omega Point.  He says that the Omega Point is a “self-programming universal 
Turing machine, with a literal infinity of memory” (1995: 249 – 250).  Tipler also says 
that the Omega Point is an accelerating machine (1995: 265, 462, 505).  Hence the 
Omega Point is an Accelerating Turing Machine.   
10Nietzsche advocates an aesthetic theodicy.  He says existence is justified aesthetically 
(The Birth of Tragedy, 5, 24; The Gay Science, 54; The Will to Power, 416, 1019).  The 
celebration of the dramatic beauty of existence is the love of fate (amor fati; see Ecce 
Homo, 3:10; The Gay Science, 276).  It is absolute or Dionysian affirmation (Twilight of 
the Idols, 9:49; The Will to Power, 1041, 1032). 
11Reflection principles have an illustrious history in mathematics.  For a non-technical 
introduction, see Rucker (1995).  For a more technical introduction, see Reinhardt (1974). 
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